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"Natural Law is at the root beginnings of our Common Law and
Equity. This alone may recommend its re-examination by those who
in these troubled days seek an adequate philosophy of law."
Professor Barrett expressed these sentiments in the following address
delivered at the Natural Law Symposium of the Catholic Lawyers
Guild, Buflalo, N. Y., February 6, 1954. It is reprinted from 4 Buflalo
Law Review 1 (1954) in response to numerous requests.
THE NATURAL LAW AND THE
LAWYER'S SEARCH FOR A
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
EDWARD F. BARRETT*
A judge of sentient mind and heart would hardly be able to endure
the responsibilities of office if he were denied the guiding influence
and sustaining strength of Natural Law precepts and philosophy.
- ROBERT N. WILKIN 1
DO LAWYERS NEED a philosophy of law? What business have they
with philosophy at all? Plato has no "forms for McKinney;" Aristotle
doesn't annotate the Civil Practice Act; Aquinas is no substitute for
Shepard. Yet a great judge has noted "the impulse of jurisprudence in
these days to fling herself into the arms of philosophy for shelter and
consolation." 2 For philosophy is at bottom one's answers to man's
persistent questions Where from? What for? Where to? There is no
Fifth Amendment immunity here. Lawyers also must answer and on
their answers hangs a whole philosophy of law. Shocking, but consistent,
is the philosophy of law flowing logically from Holmes' doubts whether
man is significantly different from a baboon, or an idea cosmically
more important than the bowels. Hitler's answers produced the Nazi
laws against Jews; Stalin's, the system under which Cardinal Mindszenty's
Communist prosecutors could murder a man's mind - legally.
Justice Holmes noted that our law is filled with words of moral
content.4 The Canons of Professional Ethics speak of "honor," "con-
"Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Notre Dame.
'Wilkin, Natural Law in American Jurisprudence, 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATURAL
LAW INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME 148 (1949).
'Cardozo, Address before the New York State Bar Association, Jan. 1932; SELECTED
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, 8 (ed. Hall, 1947).
'2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 22 (Howe ed. 1941); 2 id. at 242.
'HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, 168, 169, 179 (1921).
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science," "moral law." " Statutes and deci-
sions abound in terms like "decency,"
"morality," "crimes mala in se," and
"crimes mala prohibita." Judges with the
office, if no longer with the title of "Chan-
cellor" still hear prayers in Equity when
"good faith" is the issue. Courts enforce
rules of which these moral content words
are the heart. Should such words be cut
out of the body of the law in the interest
of greater legal health, as Justice Holmes
suggested? 6 Judges of "sentient mind and
heart," however crudely positivistic their
off-the-bench excursions into philosophy in
the abstract, constantly use these moral
content words in deciding cases. In "fair-
ness," "fair play" and "natural justice"
Holmes as a judge found tests for deter-
mining how far constructive service can go
in securing jurisdiction in personam.7
The fact is that these moral content
words, if banished today as permissible
media concludendi, return tomorrow. Phi-
losophy alone gives them their true content,
their function in the law, and thus deter-
mines whether we welcome them at the
front door or smuggle them in disguised
at some side entrance. Say with some that
"justice" and "fairness" mean "justice" and
"fairness" only according to the "dominant
mores of the community" where invoked.
Say with Chief Justice Vinson that "all
concepts are relative." 8 Should not the
Nuremberg convictions then be revised?
The Nazi defendants pleaded that they but
followed the "dominant mores" of their
5Canons 15, 29, 32, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION.
'HOLMES, op. cit. supra note 4.
'McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 91 (1917).
'Dennis et al. v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 508
(1951).
community and that "crime against hu-
manity" is a relative concept. Or, are we
to admit that at Nuremberg there was no
"law" except the ancient "Vae Victis!"
and no "right" but the "might" of the con-
querors? Rather than end his search for a
philosophy of law thus, the lawyer might
well take another, perhaps a new look at
the old Natural Law philosophy of law.
In a case decided a century ago in New
York, Chancellor James Kent defined Nat-
ural Law: 9
... those fit and just rules which the Creator
has prescribed to man as a dependent and
social being; and which are to be ascertained
from the deductions of right reason though
they may be more precisely known and
more explicitly declared by Divine Revela-
tion.
This "Natural Law" approach is the orig-
inal American Jurisprudence. In the first
sentence of the first public paper of the
United States the American people appeal
beyond man-made law to the "law of na-
ture and of nature's God." They affirm as
"self-evident" that God made man and in
creating him endowed him with certain
"unalienable rights." To make sure of their
enjoyment of these rights men institute
governments. The Declaration of Inde-
pendence was not the work of men who
thought of man as a baboon, nor did they
equate in importance his reason and his
entrails.
To write the first sentence of a piece of
history is to tear a seamless web. 10 To at-
tribute to the creation of man by God the
"unalienable" character of essential human
'Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343, 349
(1820).
"1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW I (2d ed. 1952).
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rights is to posit a whole philosophy of law.
Cardinal Newman said that the word "God"
is a "theology in itself." 11 It is a jurispru-
dence in itself as well. If God created man
(to "create" is to "make out of nothing")
then to God the Creator, man the creature
owes his first duty. He must have therefore
as the "endowment" of his divinely created
nature those rights without which his primal
duty to God cannot be discharged. Such
rights are rooted in his nature as a created
and (in Kent's words) "dependent" being.
They are "natural" rights therefore, and as
such, "unalienable." Man cannot give them
away; no man-made authority is competent
to take them from him.
"Right" and "duty" connote some law
establishing them. The law establishing the
"unalienable natural rights" of God's crea-
ture man, is the "law of nature and of
nature's God." The expression is no logical
dichotomy. The "law of nature" reflects
"the law of God" - the whole plan of crea-
tion by God, the Supremely Intelligent
Creator. For the conferring of "rights" im-
plies purposeful action. Rights are con-
ferred so that an end or objective may be
achieved through their exercise. Brutes need
no rights. Their achievement of the Crea-
tor's purpose as to them is a "can't help"
(Holmes might say) 12 of their nature. Man
is free. Divine Wisdom requires that he
know the demands of the Creator upon
"'HARROLD, A NEWMAN TREASURY, p. 42 (1943).
The full quotation is from the second of the nine
discourses which constitute The Idea of a Uni-
versity: "The word 'God' is a Theology in itself,
indivisibly one, inexhaustibly various, from the
vastness and the simplicity of its meaning. Admit
a God and you introduce among the subjects of
your knowledge, a fact encompassing, closing in
upon, absorbing, every other fact conceivable."
'1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, 122 (Howe ed.
1941).
him. Thus, as Kent says, even without
Divine Revelation, man's own right reason
can ascertain the essentials, the first prin-
ciples of his duty to his Creator. These
principles and the rational inferences or
corollaries flowing from them are the Nat-
ural Law. Nineteen centuries ago, St. Paul
wrote of the Gentiles who, without Reve-
lation, do the works of Revelation and thus
show the Natural Law written on their
hearts. 13 Seventeen centuries after St. Paul,
an English lawyer, one of the glories of
our Common Law, writing still in the same
Judaeo-Christian Natural Law tradition,
penned this preface to his survey of English
law: 14
When the Supreme Being formed the uni-
verse and created matter out of nothing, he
impressed certain principles upon that mat-
ter from which it can never depart and with-
out which it would cease to be.... This then,
is the general significance of law; a rule of
action dictated by some superior being; and
in those creatures that have neither the
power to think nor to will, such laws must
be invariably obeyed, so long as the creature
itself subsists, for its existence depends on
that obedience. But laws in their more con-
fined sense and in which it is our present
business to consider them, denote the rules,
not of action in general, but of human action
or conduct, that is the precepts by which
man.., endowed with both reason and free
will, is commanded to make use of those
faculties in the general regulation of his
behavior. . . . [S]ince man depends abso-
lutely upon his maker for everything, it is
necessary that he should in all points con-
form to his maker's will. This will of his
maker is called the law of nature. For as
God, when he created matter and endowed
it with a principle of mobility, established
certain rules for the perpetual direction of
"Romans ii, 14-15.
1'1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 27-31 (Lewis
ed., Philadelphia, 1771).
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that motion . . . so, when he created man,
and endowed him with free will to conduct
himself in all parts of life, he laid down cer-
tain immutable laws of human nature,
whereby that free will is in some degree reg-
ulated and restrained, and gave him also the
faculty of reason to discover the purport of
those laws . . . [as] a Being of Infinite Wis-
dom the Creator has laid down for his crea-
tures only such laws as were founded in
those relations of Justice that existed in the
nature of things antecedent to any positive
precept - the eternal and immutable laws of
good and evil to which the Creator Himself
conforms and which He has enabled human
reason to discover, so far as they are neces-
sary for the conduct of human actions.
How is Natural Law related to man-made
law? Our Declaration answers that gov-
ernments are man-made devices to "secure"
the "unalienable" rights of men. The word
"secure" means here, as it does in the
Preamble to the Constitution, 15 not to
"obtain" something new or previously not
possessed, but to insure the safety of some-
thing already enjoyed. Thus, the right to
worship God according to the dictates of
conscience is not the generous gift of gov-
ernment. No human institution can make
a gift to man of that which God has already
given him before human law or government
existed. It is the proper province of gov-
ernment to protect by human law this
God-given right. The First Amendment
does not "create" freedom of religion based
on the dictates of conscience. It stays the
restless hand of government from impair-
ing or attempting to destroy the expression
of conscience by prohibiting Congress from
passing laws of the type which history
sadly shows have most often made a mock-
ery of freedom of religion. Catholic theo-
logian and English Protestant lawyer bear
'ZMORLEY, THE POWER IN THE PEOPLE, 18-25
(1949).
witness alike that a human law contrary to
Natural Law is void:
St. Thomas Aquinas says: 16
The Natural Law is the rational creature's
participation of the eternal law .... Every
human law has just so much of the nature
of law as it is derived from the law of nature.
But if in any point it departs from the law
of nature, it is no longer a law but a perver-
sion of law.
Sir William Blackstone says:17
This law of nature, being co-eval with man-
kind and dictated by God Himself, is of
course superior in obligation to any other.
It is binding over all the globe, in all coun-
tries, and at all times; no human laws are of
any validity if contrary to this; and such of
them as are valid derive all their force and
all their authority mediately or immediately
from this original.... Upon these two foun-
dations, the law of nature and the law of
revelation depend all human laws; that is to
say, no human laws should be suffered to
contradict these.
Thanks to the Ninth Amendment - quite
aptly called the "Forgotten Amendment"
these days - the Natural Law of philosophy
explicit in the Declaration of Independence
is implicit in the Constitution. The Ninth
Amendment reads:
The enumeration in the Constitution of cer-
tain rights shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.
If the word "rights" implies a law estab-
lishing them, and if the American people
"retain" rights not expressed in the Con-
stitution, nor set out in any human statutes,
such "retained rights" can have no other
source or origin than the Natural Law to
which the Declaration appealed.
"Mere rhetoric?"
"Summa Theologica, 1-11, Q. xci, a. 2; Q. xcv,
a. 2.
'71 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 41' (Jones ed.,
1915).
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In 1922 the people of Oregon by a
majority vote in a direct popular refer-
endum passed a law which would jail as a
common criminal the parents who sent their
children under sixteen years of age to a
private or parochial school. In Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,18 a unanimous United
States Supreme Court declared this law
unconstitutional and void as a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Now, neither
that Amendment nor any other portion of
the Constitution in so many express words
guarantees the existence of parochial or
private schools. True, the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids any state to take a
person's life, liberty or property without
due process of law. Does this mean that a
state cannot, in the name of what a ma-
jority of its people consider civic advance-
ment, require that all children attend the
state's own schools? Certainly when the
whole people of a state by direct majority
vote pass a law, it would seem that the
highest measure of "democratic" due proc-
ess of law has been achieved (especially if
one puts a premium on "what the crowd
wants"). 9 Presumably also the Oregon
"8268 U. S. 510 (1925). Commenting on this deci-
sion in his Encyclical Letter, Rappresentanti in
Terra, The Christian Education of Youth, Dec.
31, 1929, Pope Pius XI said: "This incontestable
right of the family has at various times been recog-
nized by nations anxious to respect the natural law
in their civil enactments. Thus, to give one recent
example, the Supreme Court of the United States
of North America, in a decision on an important
controversy, declared that it is not in the compe-
tence of the state to fix any uniform standard of
education by forcing children to receive instruc-
tion exclusively in public schools, and it bases its
decision on the natural law ....... HuSSLEIN,
SOCIAL WELLSPRINGS - EIGHTEEN ENCYCLICALS
ON SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION BY POPE PIUS XI, 99
(1942).
101 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, 163 (Howe ed.
1941).
School Law mirrored the "dominant mores"
of Oregon in 1922. Nevertheless the Su-
preme Court held the law void. Mr. Justice
Holmes whose derision of Natural Law
doctrines is well known, did not dissent,
however, when Mr. Justice McReynolds
(bate noir of all good "liberals") spoke for
the Supreme Court: 20
The fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the state to
standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only.
The child is not the creature of the state.
Those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right coupled with the
high duty to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations.
Whence comes this "right coupled with
the high duty"? If the parent's right to
direct the education of his child falls be-
yond the pale of permissible state power
expressed in man-made law, the "right"
must be one "retained" by the people. It
was never yielded up by them to any gov-
ernment (the soul of the child being God's,
how can man sell it to the State?). The
source of this "retained right" is the "law
of nature and of nature's God." From the
Ninth Amendment Natural Law philosophy
streams in to illuminate the judicial task
of interpreting the broad phrases of the
Fourteenth.
A renaissance of Natural Law doctrines
- a return to the original and authentic
American philosophy of law - may yet
rescue the Ninth Amendment from unde-
served oblivion. The United States Supreme
Court is concerned these days with the
extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment
makes the restrictions originally placed
-268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925). (Cf. comment on the
decision in 7 MARQ. L. REV. 96).
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upon the Federal Government by the "Bill
of Rights" likewise restrictions upon the
States. Some say all the original restrictions
have been thus transferred. Musty records
of Congressional debates and Committee
Reports ninety years old are exhumed to
support this broad claim. Others make
claims more limited. They question not
only the historical accuracy but the political
wisdom of a wholesale "transfer" of the
"Bill of Rights." They point out that some
of the restrictions are "less important" than
others. They resort to the somewhat dema-
gogic distinction between "human" and
"property" rights (as if all rights are not
human or personal rights in or to some
"thing," some "res," tangible or intangible).
They cite recent judicial "rearrangements"
of the restrictions of the first ten amend-
ments in some ascending (or descending)
hierarchic scheme of values. We are not
surprised then to see some judges taking,
albeit with "faltering steps and slow," the
road which leads to Natural Law, 21 for they
still speak cautiously in adjectives like
"fundamental" or "basic," in phrases like
"decencies of civilization." 2 2 These are
"half way houses," "lodgings for the night."
They are not the journey's end of jurispru-
dence. The dilemma is acute. If "all
concepts are relative," are there then
"fundamental-relative-rights" or "relative-
fundamental-rights?" 23 Does the Supreme
Court thus propose to answer the lawyer's
"Mr. Justice Frankfurter, specially concurring in
Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947); cf.
Adler, Natural Law and Positive Law, 1 PROCEED-
INGS OF THE NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE, UNIVER-
SITY OF NOTRE DAME 92 (1949).
"Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U. S. 346, 353
(1913).
'One thinks of Polonius' "pastoral-comical, his-
torical-pastoral, tragical-historical, tragical-comi-
cal-historical-pastoral." HAMLET, II, ii. 394-396.
search for a philosophy of law? "The
hungry sheep look up and are not fed." 24
We are told by some, however, that
Natural Law doctrines come "trailing
clouds," if not of "glory," at least of men-
acing "theology." 21 The invidious adjective
"Catholic" is placed in front of "Natural
Law," and its doctrines thus represented as
a kind of "Catholic Trojan Horse" (full of
Bishops, no doubt). In charity these sug-
gestions might be called misunderstanding.
American Catholic lawyers and judges will
proudly accept the ennobling privilege of
championing Natural Law jurisprudence.
They recall that it is the original American
philosophy of law. They had not thought
it necessary to insist that Natural Law
antedates Catholicism and even Christianity
itself. They know as did the founders of
this Republic, that Natural Law, by its very
definition, can be no Catholic theological
or philosophical monopoly. Natural Law
is the God-given birthright of all men as
the creatures of God. Thomas Aquinas and
Thomas Jefferson agree. Each talks of
Natural Law as the possession of man - of
man as God's creature, not of man as Jew
or Gentile, Catholic or Protestant, nor of
man as black, white, red, yellow or brown.
Natural Law commands the sovereignty
of conscience - the Latin word means
"knowing with" - and dictates that for what
a man "knows with" his God he shall not
be challenged by human law nor punished
by the State when he walks humbly with
his Maker as conscience dictates. Natural
Law, recognized by the Declaration of In-
dependence and driven deep into the orig-
"MILTON, LYCIDAS, 1. 125.
'Gerhart, The Doctrine of Natural Law, 26 N. Y.
U. LAW REV. 76, 119 (1951).
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inal philosophy of law of the American
lawyer and into the Constitution which is
so much the work of his hands and brain,
gives the bed-rock basis of religious free-
dom, just as it does for human dignity of
which freedom of religion is a part. For the
term "human dignity" is kicked around
today until it looks like a deflated football.
"Dignity" means "worthiness." Man's dig-
nity consists in worthiness of the status
attributed to him as the creature of God.
The American Republic came into exist-
ence with such a concept of man's dignity,
protected by Natural Law. If all this
amounts to a "Trojan Horse," the "Horse"
was made in America. It is big enough to
hold all Americans.
Natural Law doctrine is "too vague and
impractical"-this objection comes strangely
from the lawyer thinking of the perfectly
clear and certain rules of law appellate
courts apply in 5-4 decisions. Perhaps the
objection springs from confusing authentic
Natural Law with perversions of it, perhaps
from demanding of it therefore what it
does not claim to give. Eighteenth century
speculators dreamed of pre-social man liv-
ing in an idyllic Golden Age, a "noble
savage" happily governed only by a com-
plete Natural Law Code. He could still
retain this pristine happiness in society if
human lawmakers merely entered in their
statute books carbon copies of this pre-
social Code. Hence the apocryphal tale of
the legislative committee in French Revo-
lutionary days ordering from the library
Volume I of the Natural Law Code. This is
not the Natural Law we speak of here. The
legislature at Albany will seek in vain for
a Natural Law section on, say, the liability
of the restrictive indorser of a negotiable
note.
Natural Law indeed dictates that agree-
ments men make fairly and reasonably with
each other should be kept - else the social
end of man would be frustrated. It leaves
to human law makers the here-and-now
prudent determination or specification of
this command. 26 Law student casebooks
still reprint and lawyers still consult for its
principles Coggs v. Bernard,2 7 the ancestral
case on bailment law decided in 1703. They
do not ask of it a specific rule, expressly
formulated, on, say, the liability of Ameri-
can Airlines as a bailee of perishable gro-
ceries.
Natural Law mandating that agreements
be kept, has no quarrel with the lawmaker
who by statute requires that certain kinds
of contracts be in writing as a condition of
enforcement, in order to lessen the dangers
of perjury. The view we are taking does not
make of traditional Natural Law teaching
"Natural Law with a variable content."
Natural Law fundamental dictates do not
change. Human determinations of them,
not violative of these dictates themselves,
can and must change to meet the changing
circumstances of developing social life. No
human legislature may sanctify murder; it
is free to enact a Statute of Frauds. Natural
Law dictates are thus fulfilled in many ways
lest one once-necessary human specification
of their operation should through obso-
lescence injure those it was made to serve.
Natural Law then is truly "catholic"
(with a small "c"). It welcomes the "ana-
lytical" jurists, the Hohfelds concerned with
exacting analysis of concepts developed by
man-made law. It applauds the Maitlands
2 6McKinnon, Natural Law and Positive Law, I
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE,
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME, 99, 100 (1949).
27 2 Ld. Raym. 909 (1704).
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whose historical researches may show that
what we lawyers come too easily sometimes
to mistake as a priori rules are historical
accidents. Natural Law has room for a
Positivism which tests man-made rules in
terms of sheer workability, for it recognizes
that there are vast numbers of such rules
devoid of specific moral significance. It is
indifferent to these (as the philosophers
say), except that it may counsel prudence
in their making or their repeal, and except
that it adds its own peculiar sanction to
these rules once fairly and prudently made.
Natural Law, however, will insist that none
of these auxiliary juristic sciences claim
solely sovereign sway and masterdom in
the house of jurisprudence, for the final
criterion of human law is conformity with
the law of man's Creator reflected in, and
revealed to man by, his reason itself.
Natural Law is at the root beginnings
of our Common Law and Equity. This alone
may recommend its re-examination by those
who in these troubled days seek an adequate
philosophy of law. From widely differing
fields we cite a few examples. The oyster
shell of Equity grew up around and enclosed
the pearl of Natural Law. The indebtedness
of "Quasi-Contract" law to Natural Law is
well known. In London about 1760, Mr.
Moses indorsed Mr. Jacob's note to Mr.
MacFerlan who promised, nevertheless, not
to sue on the indorsement. MacFerlan
broke this promise, sued Moses at Com-
mon Law in the King's Bench, had judg-
ment and collected on it. Moses then,
nothing daunted, sued in the same court to
get his money back. Procedure then re-
quired that the suit be brought on a theory
of contract. Defense counsel pertinently
asked where was MacFerlan's contract to
repay. On the facts this point seemed
technically unassailable, but Lord Mans-
field said:-'8
If the defendant be under an obligation from
ties of natural justice to refund, the law im-
plies a debt and gives this action founded
in the Equity of the plaintiff's case . . . to
recover money which ought not in justice to
be kept. In one word . . . the defendant is
obliged by ties of natural justice and Equity
to refund the money.
From what precedent or statute, what
man-made law came this "obligation"?
There was none. It helps not to say that
Mansfield, incorrigible civilian, "borrowed"
Roman Law. The lawyer in quest of a phi-
losophy of law is not thus to be put off.
Whence did the Roman lawyers draw the
concept of "unjust enrichment"? It will not
help to say that Mansfield, like the Roman
lawyers resorted to the "fiction" of "im-
plied promise." We ask Why? We need not
go back to the praetor for instances of the
use of "fiction" as a judicial tool or tech-
nique of justice. We seek the animating
force - the glan vital (if you please) -
behind the English judge's resort to fiction.
Mansfield gives the answer. He speaks of
"natural justice" as the well-spring of
human justice, of "natural law" as the in-
forming source of man-made law.
We jump two centuries - from the King's
Bench in 1760 to the New York Court of
Appeals in 1951 - from Equity and Quasi-
Contract to Torts. In Woods v. Lancet,-9 an
infant plaintiff sued for damages resulting
from defendant's negligence when the plain-
tiff still lay in his mother's womb in the
ninth month of pregnancy. Plaintiff alleged
that as a result of the negligence he was
born permanently crippled. The courts be-
low had dismissed the action, relying on
2 Moses v. MacFerlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1008 (1760).
-303 N. Y. 351 (1951).
THE CATHOLIC LAWYER
Drobner v. Peters,30 decided in the Court
of Appeals itself some thirty years before
and holding that no such action lies. In
Woods v. Lancet, Judge Desmond put the
question: "Shall we follow Drobner v.
Peters or shall we bring the Common Law
of this state into accord with justice? I
think we should make the law conform to
Right." 31 Drobner v. Peters was expressly
overruled. The plaintiff was sent back to
have his day in court. Long ago Chancellor
Kent had said that "decisions which seem
contrary to reason ought to be examined
without fear and revised without reluct-
ance." 32 Natural Law can come down to
cases.
Family law, "Domestic Relations" law,
as we have inherited it, is almost unintel-
ligible without an understanding of the role
Natural Law has played in its development
especially in the far-off days when family
law was so largely administered by ecclesi-
astical courts.33 Today it is no less true
that if you drive Natural Law out with a
pitchfork in this field, it will force its way
back. Many states have today abolished the
action by a wife or husband for alienation
of a spouse's affections by a third party.
With such a statute in the background,
Daily v. Parker,34 reached the court. De-
fendant's feminine charms had lured away
a husband and father from his wife and
minor children. The statute barred an action
by the wife. The children, however, sued
the defendant alleging that she had deprived
-°232 N. Y. 220 (1921).
-'303 N. Y. 351 (1951).
2 1 KENT, COMMENTARIES, 477 (13th ed.).
'Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Cons. 53, 63-
65 (1811) (Opinion by Sir William Scott); see
also SIR JAMES DALRYMPLE OF STAIR, INSTITUTES
OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND, Pt. 1, Tit. IV (1681).
38152 F. (2d) 174 (7th Cir. 1945).
them of their right to their father's com-
panionship, care, affection and support.
The court agreed with the defendant that
nowhere in our books had such an action
as this been even mentioned. It neverthe-
less allowed the suit. A new positive right
was thus expressly recognized. Was the
natural right of the children the "raw ma-
terial" out of which the new positive right
was fashioned? In Natural Law the Com-
mon Law of our own day finds a
"principle of growth."
Busy lawyers apply every day rules of
long standing. There is little time and often
less occasion for them to re-examine the
remote historical origins of these familiar
rules. It is hornbook law now that a surety
can compel the debtor to "exonerate" him
by paying the creditor when the debt is
due.35 The first reported case so holding
dates from 1492. The relief was granted
when a surety prayed the Chancellor, Arch-
bishop John of Canterbury, that the debtor
be compelled to do "his duty in con-
science." 36 And nearly four hundred years
later Chancellor Kent could say that "the
right of exoneration stands not on contract
but on natural justice," and "accords with
a common sense of justice and the natural
equity of mankind." 37 Again, hornbook
blackletters say that a surety has reimburse-
ment at Common Law from the principal
whose debt he is forced to pay. 38 It was not
always so. It was not so until Decker v.
Pope,3 9 in 1757 when Lord Mansfield found
'SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SURETY-
SHIP, 198 (1950).
'aGiglis v. Welby, I Cal. Proc. in Ch. cxx, cited in
AMES, CASES ON SURETYSHIP, 583 (1901).
'Hays v. Ward, 4 Johns. Ch. 123, 131 (1819).
"SIMPSON, op. cit. supra note 35, at 224.
"I Selwyn Nisi Prius 91 (1757).
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a way to enforce at Common Law in the
King's Bench the right of reimbursement
hitherto to be had only in Chancery. When
at your request I guarantee your debt to
C, this is, as Mansfield said "a sufficient
consideration to raise a promise in law" 40
that if I have to pay C, you will reimburse
me. Judicial legislation? We are no longer
shocked by that today. But what impelled
the court to say that an obligation is here
implied? Why is there a "sufficient consid-
eration to raise a promise" in law when a
promise in fact is lacking? "Sufficient con-
sideration," "implied promise" "implied
obligation"-all this is lawyer's "shop talk,"
the "articulate premises" of the decision.
The "inarticulate premise" is the Natural
Law dictate of restitution.
Again in the law of Suretyship when I
as surety am forced to pay your debt to
C, I am "subrogated" to all C's rights
against you.41 Whence this rule? We are
not asking merely the name of the case in
the reports where it first appears, but for
the rock bottom basis of "subrogation."
That may be of more than academic interest
when a surety whose hands are soiled comes
to Equity to seek the remedy. "Natural
Justice," said Kent;4 ' "the plainest prin-
ciples of Natural Justice," 43 said Brou-
gham. Natural Law for these authentic
voices of Equity is no mere "brooding
omnipresence" in some remote theological
sky. Having given birth to a basic principle
of law, is Natural Law no longer to be
invoked as a guide to its growth?
Time permits but one more example.
From Partnership comes Meinhard v.
'°
0 bid.
SIMPsoN, op. cit. supra note 34 at 205.
'2Hays v. Ward, supra note 37.
"Hodgson v. Shaw, 3 Myl. & K. 183, 190 (1834).
Salmon.4 4 Meinhard and Salmon were part-
ners (technically "joint adventurers," but
it matters little since the rules of the game
are substantially the same) in operating a
business in a building leased by them. The
lease was about to end and with it the
joint adventure of the two. Salmon secretly
secured from the landlord a renewal of the
lease in his own name alone. He tried, said
Judge Cardozo, "to steal a march on his
comrade under the cover of the darkness
and then hold the captured ground." 41 But
"loyalty and comradeship are not so easily
abjured." The court held that Salmon must
hold the renewed lease for the benefit of
Meinhard as well as for himself: 4"
Joint adventurers like copartners owe to one
another, while the enterprise continues, the
duty of the finest loyalty. Those forms of
conduct permissible in a work-a-day world
for those acting at arms length are forbidden
to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of
the market place. Not honesty alone but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior. As to this
there has developed a tradition that is un-
bending and inveterate. Uncompromising
rigidity has been the attitude of equity when
petitioned to undermine the rule of undi-
vided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion"
of particular exceptions. Only thus has the
level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at
a level higher than that trodden by the
crowd. It will not be consciously lowered by
any judgment of this court.
Why this "higher standard" for "fiduci-
aries"? By what criterion are the "morals
of the market place" excluded from the
"mores" of the community which for some
are the sovereign source alike of Ethics and
of Law? Is it a sufficient answer to say that
"164 N. E. 545 (1928).
"id. at 547.
4"id. at 546.
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partners are fiduciaries? Will the lawyer
in quest of a philosophy of law be put off
by this demurrer? The questions drive him
back to the Natural Law. "Fiduciary" is
from Latin "fiducia." "Fiducia" itself is
from Latin "fides" which in three thousand
years has not yet lost its "moral content"
and which Natural Law alone at last
explains.
For those then who would dismiss Nat-
ural Law doctrine as an impertinent and
impractical piece of piety, Judge Robert
N. Wilkin, until recently Judge of the
United States District Court for Northern
Ohio, a judge and no theologian save in the
sense that the "science of God" is as much
of interest to laymen as the "science of
rocks," a lawyer and no philosopher save
in the sense that laymen too may seek to
know the "final causes of things," has
written: 47
I give this personal testimony in support of
Natural Law. Ever since I became interested
in the philosophy of law I have been hearing
opponents of Natural Law say: It is imprac-
tical. It is idealistic. Its aims and principles
are all very well for such reflective studies
as Ethics and Moral Philosophy, but they
have no place in the actual administration
of positive law.
As a result of ten years of experience as a
trial judge in a United States District Court
I am convinced that such assertions are not
true. In fact they are mere nonsense. The
principles, standards and precepts of Natural
Law are continually employed by courts as
the constitutions, statutes and precedents are
interpreted and applied to the ever-varying
circumstances of life. They are employed
also in the interpretation of wills, contracts,
conduct and relationships of life. They are
part of man's nature and cannot be sepa-
rated from his life.
"Wilkin, op. cit. supra note 1, at 146-147.
Courts continually use such tests as, What
is reasonable? What is true? What is fair?
What is just? They do not stop to ask Pilate's
question. They are not disturbed by the in-
tricate ratiocinations of the skeptics who
think that all such concepts are merely sub-
jective and actually unattainable. Courts are
not deterred by such conceits .... Not only
do courts actually employ the ideals and
standards of Natural Law; I shall say fur-
ther, that a Judge of sentient mind and heart
would hardly be able to endure the respon-
sibilities of office if he were denied the guid-
ing influence and sustaining strength of
Natural Law precepts and philosophy.
Judge Wilkin's words reaffirm the phi-
losophy of law which breathed into Anglo-
American law the soul which has for cen-
turies sustained it. Henry de Bracton,
clergyman and judge, in the first institu-
tional treatise our law knows, wrote in the
thirteenth century: "by virtue of his nature
man is free and according to this slaves are
free and in this respect insofar as the civil
law and the jus gentium recognize slavery
they detract from Natural Law." 48 For
s""Taking a text from the Roman jurist Floren-
tinus, Henry of Bracton infused into it new life
and energy and declared that 'by virtue of his
nature man is free.' On this principle he boldly
argues that slaves are entitled to their freedom:
Sed secunduin hoc servi sunt liberi. The Roman
Civil Law and the Jus Gentin which recognized
the institution of slavery are accordingly con-
demned. In hac parte jus civile vel gentium de-
trahit juri nturali. In this matter Roman Civil
Law and the Jus Gentium (which was the private
international law of the ancient world) run
counter to the natural law. In the next sentence
Bracton denounces servitude as a rule of the Jus
Gentium by which one man is subjected to the
dominion of another against natural right and
justice (contra naturam). The natural law is for
him and, one may say, for all the lawyers and
philosophers of his time the reflection of the
divine wisdom in the mind and life of reasonable
creatures, and a first principle of morals." O'SUL-
LIVAN, THE INHERITANCE OF THE COMMON LAW,
12 (1950).
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John Fortescue, Chief Justice of the King's
Bench in the fifteenth century, "Natural
Law is the mother and mistress of all
human laws." 49 In the Common Pleas in
1469, Yelverton, J., addressing counsel,
says: "We are to act as the canonists and
civilians do when a case comes before them
for which they find no law - they resort to
the Law of Nature which is the ground
of all laws." 50 In the piquant law - French
of an old fourteenth century Year Book
reporting a King's Bench case involving an
obscure point of Real Property Law, Shar-
shulle, J. refers to precedents but adds:
"Nulle ensaumple est si forte come resoun,"
and when counsel insists on stare decisis
and Hilary, J. would have it that "ley est
volonte des justices," Stonore, C. J. replies:
"Nanyl: ley est resoun." t Writing his
Tenures at the end of the fifteenth century
(and in the seventeenth century Coke will
call the book "the most perfect and absolute
work that ever was written in any sci-
ence" 52), Littleton, sometime Judge of
Common Pleas, concludes his work with a
flourish some have compared to the style
of Aquinas, "Lex plus laudatur quando
ratione probatur."5 3 In 1608 Edward Coke
and Francis Bacon, so often opposed, unite
'"De Nat. Legis Naturae, i. c. xxix.
'Anon., Y. B. 3 Ed. IV 9 (Mich. pl. 9), as cited
in ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING, 186 (3d ed.
1939).
5'Y. B. 18 & 19 Ed. III (1345), R. S. 376, cited
in ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING, n. 323.
5-2 Co. Rep. 67a; 10 Co. Rep., pref. pp. xxviii-xxx;
Co. Lit. 311a.
r'LITTLETON, TENURES, (Eng. tr. ed. Wambaugh,
1903) 341. Cf. also O'Sullivan, The Natural Law
and Common Law, 3 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT-
URAL LAW INSTITUTE. UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE
DAME, 30 (1950).
in Calvin's Case,5 4 in affirming the Natural
Law foundations of the law of England.
Said Coke, "The Law of Nature which
God at the time of the creation of man
infused into his heart for his preservation
and direction was before any judicial or
municipal law and it is immutable.
55
Said Bacon, "As the Common Law is more
worthy than the statute law, so the Law of
Nature is more worthy than them both....
Our law is grounded upon the Law of
Nature." 56 The Reformation had cut many
ties, but not the tie of the Natural Law
tradition. Six years after Calvin's Case,
Hobart, J., not knowing and not fearing
that future centuries would make Eng-
land's Parliament "omnicompetent," could
say : 7 "A law made against natural equity,
is void in itself, for the law of nature is
immutable; it is the law of laws." And the
"judicious" Hooker, Bishop of the Church
of England, could write, (and a great
American Law School still honors his
words) :58
Of Law there can be no lesse acknowledged,
than that her seate is the bosom of God, her
voyce the harmony of the world, all things
in Heaven and Earth doe her homage, the
very least feeling her care, and the greatest
as not exempted from her power; both an-
gels and men and creatures of what condi-
tion soever, though each in different sort
and manner, yet all with uniforme consent,
admiring her as the mother of their peace
and joy.
The mighty chorus swells with mighty
57 Rep. 1 (1608).
'Id. at 12a n.
56BACON'S WORKS, Vol. 5, 202, 225 (Spedding
2d ed. 1870).
"Day v. Savage, Hob. Rep. 87 (1614).
"Ecclesiastical Polity, i. c. 18 (Everyman's Lib.
ed.).
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voices as Locke,5 9  Mansfield,6 0  Black-
stone, 61 Burke 62 are added in the old, and
Hamilton,"3  Jefferson, 64  Wilson 6i and
"The obligations of the law of nature cease not
in society, but only in many cases are drawn
closer, and have by human laws known penalties
annexed to them to enforce their observation.
Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule
to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules
that they make for other men's actions must, as
well as their own, and other men's actions be
conformable to the law of nature, i. e., to the will
of God, of which that is a declaration, and the
fundamental law of nature being the preservation
of mankind, no human sanction can be good or
valid against it." SECOND TREATISE CONCERNING
CIVIL GOVERNMENT, ch. xi. (1690).
'Supra note 28.
6 Supra note 14.
'-"(The people) have no right to make a law
prejudicial to the whole community, even though
the delinquents in making such an act should be
themselves the chief sufferers by it; because it
would be made against the principles of a superior
law, which it is not the power of any community,
or the whole race of men, to alter. I mean the
will of Him who gave us our nature, and in
giving impressed an invariable law upon it. It
would be hard to point out any error more truly
subversive of all the order and beauty, of all the
peace and happiness of human society, than the
position that any body of men have a right to
make what laws they please -or that laws can
derive any authority from their institution merely,
and independent of the quality of the subject-
matter." From a Tract on the Popery Laws, as
quoted in HOFFMAN & LEVACK, BURKE'S POLITICS,
151, 152 (1949).
'""The sacred rights of mankind are not to be
rummaged for among old parchments or musty
records. They are written as with a sunbeam, in
the whole volume of human nature, by the hand
of Divinity itself and can never be erased or
obscured by mortal power." I HAMILTON, WORKS,
108.
'[The] true office of our legislators is to declare
and enforce only our natural rights and duties,
and to take none of them from us .... Questions
of natural right are triable by their conformity
with the moral sense and reason of man." (Letter
to F. W. Gilmer, June 7, 1816, 10 FORD'S WRIT-
INGS OF JEFFERSON, 32).
'"As virtue is the business of all men, the first
Kent" in the new "kingless common-
wealths across the seas."' 6" These voices
spoke again only yesterday at Nuremberg
when the Attorney General of England,
successor of Coke, Sir Hartley Shawcross
thundered once again in the name of an
outraged humanity:"6s
The warrant of no man excuseth the doing
of an illegal act. Political loyalty, military
obedience are excellent things, but they
neither require nor do they justify the com-
mission of patently wicked acts. There
comes a point where a man must refuse to
answer to his leader if he is also to answer
to his conscience.
Three centuries before Sir Hartley thus an-
swered Hitler, another English lawyer, once
Lord Chancellor, answered another tyrant
and his puppet judges: 69
My lords ye must understand that in things
touching conscience every true and good
subject is more bound to have respect to his
conscience and to his soul than any other
thing in all the world beside.
And when Thomas More, late Keeper of
the King's Conscience lay martyred, the
"King's good servant, but God's first," he
had kept faith with Bracton's "The King
is under God and the Law,"'70 with the
teachings of the Christian Apostles "we
must obey God rather than men,'' 71 with
principles of it are written in their hearts, in char-
acters so legible, that no man can pretend ignor-
ance of them, or of his obligation to practice
them." I WILSON, WORKS (ed. Andrews), Il l.
'Supra note 9.
1 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW, 684 (2d ed. 1952).
"
8Official British report of the Nuremberg prose-
cutions, 85, as cited, O'SULLIVAN, INHERITANCE
OF THE COMMON LAW, 66.
'As quoted in O'SULLIVAN, INHERITANCE OF THE
COMMON LAW, 65.
70
BRACTON, f. 5b, 107; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 181-182.
"Acts, v., 29.
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the martyred Roman lawyer Cicero's warn-
ing "to annul the Law of Nature is wholly
impossible, ' 72 with the "heroine of Nat-
ural Law," Antigone who "deemed not
that human laws were of such force that
a mortal could override the unwritten and
unfailing statutes of heaven which are not
of today or yesterday but from all time." 13
In human reason Natural Law keeps its
court and human conscience is the judge.
A philosophy of law without conscience is
a nullity - a court without a judge.
We live in a world once again half slave
and half free, a house divided against itself
in a division we fearfully concede cannot
permanently endure. Yet only last year in
our highest State Court and in the highest
tribunal of the nation counsel argued that
the word "morality" in a statute regulating
the licensing of moving pictures for public
and general exhibition to sophisticated age
and innocent youth alike, had no "objec-
tive" meaning. 4 Judicial reaction varied.
One was as follows: 7 5
Our Federal and State Constitutions assume
that the moral code, which is part of God's
order in this world exists as the substance of
society. The people of this state have acted
through their legislature on this assumption.
We have not cast ourselves adrift from that
code, nor are we so far gone in cynicism
that the word "immoral" has no meaning
for us.
But another was this: 76
Terms of such vague and undefined limits,
however, fail to furnish the objective cri-
"CICERO, PRO MILONE, as quoted, WILKIN, ETER-
NAL LAWYER: A LEGAL BIOGRAPHY OF CICERO.
225 (1947).
"SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE, 450-454.
7 Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Bd. of Regents,
305 N. Y. 336, 113 N. E. 2d 502 (1953), rev'd
346 U. S. 587 (1954).
'5305 N. Y. 336, 354, 113 N. E. 2d 502, 511.
"Id. at 366, 113 N. E. 2d at 519.
terion necessary to insure that there shall
be no interference with the exercise of rights
secured by the First Amendment.
To the latter we might humbly reply. By
what criterion are the "rights" guaranteed
by the First Amendment made lasting and
unwavering? If Natural Law provides that
criterion, shall it not be consulted also, at
least for the "objective" character of mor-
ality, before we pour "morality" itself for-
ever down the subjective drain.
There are other voices. Two recent utter-
ances give heart and hope to those who
invite lawyers to reconsider the claim of
Natural Law. One is from John Foster
Dulles, now Secretary of State. The other
is from the distinguished Hebrew scholar,
Dr. Solomon Freehof of Temple Rodef
Shalom, Pittsburgh, in a lecture on "The
Natural Law in the Jewish Tradition"77 at
the University of Notre Dame's Natural
Law Institute when representatives of the
Jewish, Confucian, Buddhist, Moslem and
Hindu religious traditions assembled under
the presidency of the Catholic Archbishop
of Los Angeles, now His Eminence James
Francis Cardinal McIntyre, to bear witness
to the universality of the Natural Law.
Said the Secretary of State:78
For world peace we must recognize two
principles. One is that there is a moral law
and that it provides the only proper sanction
for man-made laws. The other is that every
human individual, as such, has dignity and
worth that no man-made law, no human
power can rightly desecrate. Experience
shows that when men organize a society in
accordance with these two basic beliefs, they
can within such society, have peace with
each other.
775 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATURAL LAW INSTI-
TUTE, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME (1952).
"John Foster Dulles, Which Way to World Peace
. . . Revolution or Reform, 3 FREEDOM AND
UNION 8 (Oct. 1948).
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Said Rabbi Freehof: 79
(In the Jewish Tradition) the law was not
a mere human contract or the product of the
wilfulness of a tyrant or the confusion of
some town council (but) the will of God as
understood by revered scholars. . . . It was
generally obeyed in pride and in love ...
The sources of true social order are always
the same in a sprawling modern metropolis
as in a tiny medieval ghetto. Police power is
essential, but never quite sufficient. If a large
percentage of the citizens decided to be vio-
lent, . . . the police power is helpless. The
true source of order comes from within. It
is conscience which makes citizens of us all.
'05 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATURAL LAW INSTI-
TUTE, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME, 25-26
(1952).
•.. The scattered Jewish communities main-
tained law and order because the law was
accepted as coming to them from "nature
and nature's God." . . . In this small con-
fined group, the (Divine-Natural Law) was
practiced and attained a majesty which it
could not attain elsewhere....
If men believe that the law is essentially
natural and God-given, then with even a
minimum of police power, order will reign.
If men understand the legal foundations of
their own government, they are the intelli-
gent citizenry against which no tyranny can
prevail. This is the experience and the uni-
versal meaning of Divine-Natural Law in
Jewish history. It was small in scope, but it
applies ubique et omnibus, everywhere for
everybody.
The Catholic Lawyers Society of Detroit recently cooperated with the
Center for Human Relations of the University of Detroit to present the
Third Catholic Issues Forum, a series of discussion programs on topics of
current interest to lawyers and to Catholics.
Schedule of Lectures
March 22, 1955 - H-Bombs and Ethics
Leaders: Dr. Daniel L. Harmon, Chairman,
Department of Physics
Rev. A. P. Madgett, S.J.,
Department of Theology
April 5, 1955- Problems of the Aging
Leaders: Rev. Wilbur Suedkamp,
Acting Secretary for Charities,
Archdiocese of Detroit
Rev. Hugh Dunn, S.J.,
Department of Sociology
April 19, 1955- What Price Coexistence?
Leaders: Dr. Bernard F. Landuyt, Chairman,
Department of Economics
Dr. Francis A. Arlinghaus,
Department of History
May 3, 1955 - Patterns of History
Leaders: Mr. John J. Drolet,
Department of History
Dr. Walter H. Turner,
Department of Philosophy
